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THE BIOLOGICAL PASSPORT: CLOSING THE NET ON DOPING 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The use and, indeed, the dangers of performance-enhancing drugs in sports have a 
long history.  For example, the first recorded death linked to such substances during athletic 
competition took place in 1886 when a cyclist, Arthur Linton, overdosed on trimethyl.1  The 
first known use of performance-enhancing drugs at the Olympic Games occurred in 1904 
when Thomas Hicks of the United States won the Olympic marathon despite taking a 
concoction that included Strychnine and alcohol.2  In 1960, the first recorded death linked to 
drugs at the Olympic Games occurred when Danish cyclist Knud Jensen crashed and died; his 
autopsy revealed traces of amphetamines in his system.3   
It was at this time that pressure began to mount on the sporting authorities to combat 
the abuse of performance-enhancing substances.4  In 1966, the first drug tests were 
introduced by the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) and the Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association (FIFA) at their respective World Championships.5  The following year, 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) produced its first prohibited list of performance-
enhancing substances (anabolic steroids were not added to that list until 1976), and its first 
official drug tests took place at the 1968 Winter and Summer Olympic Games.6  Still, the 
1970s and 1980s saw the enactment of State Plan 14-25 in East Germany, which was a 
government plana very successful oneused for widespread systematic doping on 
promising young athletes to achieve Olympic glory.  In 1998, the Festina7 scandal in the Tour 
de France occurred, in which the police discovered large quantities of drugs in the Festina 
                                  
1
 Drugs in Sport: A Brief History, OBSERVER SPORT MONTHLY (Feb. 8, 2004) 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/osm/story/0,,1140775,00.html.  
2
 Andy Bull, Cheats Sometimes Prosper, THE GUARDIAN (London) (May 30, 2008) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2008/may/30/drugsinsport.olympicgames.  
3
 A Brief History of Anti-Doping, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/About-
WADA/History/A-Brief-History-of-Anti-Doping (last updated June 2010).  
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Id. 
7
 Festina was the number one team in the Tour de France at the time. 
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team car and also at the Festina team headquarters in Lyon, France.8  It was this incident that 
eventually led to the formation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 1999 and the 
creation of the WADA Code (the Code), which came into effect January 1, 2004.9  The Code 
was the first attempt to provide a worldwide framework for the regulation of drugs in sports.  
The backbone and primary pillar of the Code was, and still is, the principle of strict 
liability.  The Code explains the principle: “it is not necessary that intent, fault, negligence[,] 
or knowing [u]se on the [a]thlete’s part be demonstrated in order to establish an anti-doping 
violation.”10  The comments to the Code go on to state that: 
The strict liability rule . . . provides a reasonable balance between effective 
anti-doping enforcement for the benefit of all “clean” [a]thletes and fairness in 
the exceptional circumstance where a [p]rohibited [s]ubstance entered an 
[a]thlete’s system through [n]o [f]ault or [n]egligence or [n]o [s]ignificant 
[f]ault or [n]egligence on the [a]thlete’s part . . . . The strict liability principle 
set forth in the Code has been consistently upheld in the decisions of [the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport].11 
 
The strict liability principle is viewed as fundamental to the fight against doping in 
sports.  Lord Sebastian Coe12 expressed this view in 2004, stating that “we cannot, without 
blinding reason and cause, move one millimeter from strict liability [] if we do, the battle 
to save sport is lost.”13  Because the strict liability rule has been the basis of anti-doping rules 
in sports for many years, it was no surprise that the legality of the principle, in conjunction 
with the provision of a two-year ban for a doping violation, was challenged over twenty years 
ago in Gasser v. Stinson.14  In this case, Swiss middle-distance runner Sandra Gasser 
challenged the two-year ban imposed upon her for testing positive for an illegal substance.15  
She suggested that Rule 144 of the International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF), which 
                                  
8
 A Brief History of Anti-Doping, supra note 6. 
9
 WADA History, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/About-WADA/History/WADA-
History/ (last updated Nov. 2009).  
10
 WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 2.1.1 (2011) [hereinafter WADA CODE]. 
11
 See id at art. 2.1.1 cmt.  
12
 Former double Olympic Gold Medalist at the 1500m. 
13
 Sebastian Coe, We Cannot Move From Strict Liability Rule, DAILY TEL. (London) (Feb. 25, 2004) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/main.jhtml?xml=/sport/2004/02/25/socoe25.xml. 
14
 See generally Gasser v. Stinson, [1988] EWHC (Q.B.) 1 (Eng.). 
15
 Id. 
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provided strict liability, did not allow her to prove her innocence, and coupled with the 
subsequent two-year ban imposed on her for the commission of the doping violation, 
amounted to an unlawful restraint of trade.16  The Court of Queen’s Bench examined the 
strict liability rule and stated the following: 
The disqualification it imposes is automatic.  The disqualification does not 
depend upon any guilty intent on the part of the athlete.  He or she may not 
have known that the substance was being ingested.  The disqualification 
depends on no more than the finding of the prohibited substance in the 
athlete's urine.17 
The Court of Queen’s Bench went on to support the IAAF’s position that doping 
posed a very serious threat to the integrity and future of sports, specifically by endorsing the 
view of the then-IAAF General Secretary, who stated, 
“The use of drugs is widely regarded as a disease in sport.  Competitors who 
use drugs to enhance their performance are simply cheating.  Any sport [that] 
is infiltrated by drugs and in respect of which it becomes common knowledge 
that its participants use drugs is likely to suffer substantially in its public 
image and reputation.”18 
Set in this context, the Court of Queen’s Bench ruled that the restraint of trade imposed by 
the two-year ban, which was founded on the principle of strict liability, was indeed 
reasonable and proportionate and, therefore, not unlawful.19   
The principle of strict liability has also received appropriate endorsement from the 
CAS, which made clear as far back as 1995 in the case of USA Shooting & Q. v. Union 
Internationale de Tir20 that “[t]he fact that the [CAS] has sympathy for the principle of a 
strict liability rule obviously does not allow the CAS to create such a rule where it does not 
exist.”21 
                                  
16
 Id. 
17
 Id. at 4. 
18
 Id. at 15.  
19
 Id. at 16. 
20
 See generally USA Shooting & Q. v. Union Int’l de Tir, CAS 94/A/129, (May 23, 1995). 
21
 Id. at 1, ¶ 1.  
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Quite clearly, the policy of strict liability can sometimes lead to unjust results.22  
However, without a doubt, the policy was implemented for very specific reasons, which were 
aptly summed up by the CAS in USA Shooting & Q.: 
It is true that a strict liability test is likely in some sense to be unfair in an 
individual case . . . where the [a]thlete may have taken medication as the result 
of [mislabeling] or faulty advice for which he or she is not responsible . . . . 
But it is also in some sense “unfair” for an athlete to get food poisoning on the 
eve of an important competition.  Yet in neither case will the rules of the 
competition be altered to undo the unfairness.  Just as the competition will not 
be postponed to await the athlete’s recovery, so the prohibition of banned 
substance will not be lifted in recognition of its accidental absorption.  The 
vicissitudes of competition, like those of life generally, may create many types 
of unfairness, whether by accident or the negligence of unaccountable persons, 
which the law cannot repair. . . . Furthermore, it appears to be a laudable 
policy objective not to repair an accidental unfairness to an individual by 
creating an intentional unfairness to the whole body of other competitors.  
This is what would happen if banned performance-enhancing substances were 
tolerated when absorbed inadvertently.  Moreover, it is likely that even 
intentional abuse would in many cases escape sanction for lack of proof of 
guilty intent. And it is certain that a requirement of intent would invite costly 
litigation that may well cripple federations . . . .23 
That pillar, upon which anti-doping control stands, remains in place today.  Although 
it is clear that strict liability is of fundamental importance in anti-doping policies, it has come 
as no surprise that strict liability has been aided in recent years by further provisions that have 
filled in the gaps left by strict liability.  Quite obviously, without the smoking gun of a failed 
drug test, strict liability is a weapon incapable of finding its target.  This weakness was best 
demonstrated in the events surrounding the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO) 
scandal.24  If a sporting authority does not have an effective test for a performance-enhancing 
substance, then strict liability becomes irrelevant.  This was the problem that the sporting 
authorities faced with the existence of tetrahydrogestrinone (THG) before any test became 
                                  
22
 For example, Alain Baxter and Andrea Raducan both lost Olympic medals, while arguably being blameless 
for the failed tests that caused the loss of those medals. 
23
 USA Shooting, CAS 94/A/129, ¶¶ 14–15.  
24
 The Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO) scandal was an attempt to create the world’s fastest human 
being through the design and then use of artificially created, undetectable steroids.  The project succeeded when 
Tim Montgomery broke the world 100m record in September 2002 running a time of 9.78 seconds.  See 
generally U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Montgomery, CAS 2004/O/645, at 2 (Dec. 13, 2005). 
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available.  The remedy for this lacuna was as predictable as it was effective.  Non-analytical 
positives were used to great effect in securing convictions against those benefitting from the 
“undetectable,” artificially-created, performance-enhancing drugs.25 
The case brought against Michelle Collins by the United States Anti-Doping Agency 
(USADA) on December 10, 2004 was one of the first attempts by an anti-doping agency to 
secure a conviction against an athlete for taking performance-enhancing substances without 
the existence of a positive test.26  The fact that the ruling by the arbitration panel went against 
Collins was not contentious.  The USADA panel pointed out that there was substantial 
evidence against Collins, which included documents seized from BALCO, incriminating e-
mails, and suspicious, although not positive, blood and urine tests at different IOC accredited 
laboratories over several years.27 
The significance of non-analytical positives, as a further pillar upon which doping 
control stands, cannot be underestimated.  Although a relatively new weapon in the armory of 
sporting authorities, non-analytical positives have seen significant developments.  Richard 
McLaren has commented that “[p]rior to the cases arising from the BALCO affair, non-
analytical positive cases before [the] CAS primarily involved an apparent manipulation or 
contamination of a sample given by an athlete as part of the doping control sample collection 
process.”28  Any attempted manipulation or contamination of an athlete's sample is 
considered a doping offense, readily proven without the necessity of establishing the purity of 
the sample itself.29 
                                  
25
 Tim Montgomery, Dwain Chambers, Chryste Gaines, Michelle Collins, Marion Jones, and Kelli White were 
just some of the athletes caught up in the BALCO scandal.  See infra note 118. 
26
 See generally U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 00658 04 (N. Am. 
CAS Panel Dec. 10, 2004).  
27
 Id. ¶ 1.2. 
28
 Richard H. McLaren, An Overview of Non-Analytical Positive and Circumstantial Evidence Cases in Sports, 
16 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 193, 195–96 (2006).  
29
 Id. at 196. 
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Article 2.2 of the Code makes it clear that use or attempted use of a prohibited 
substance is a doping violation.30  Perhaps the most obvious example of a successful action 
against an athlete charged with interfering with her sample was brought against Irish 
swimmer Michelle Smith de Bruin.31  In making clear the appropriate burden of proof, the 
CAS explained, 
In essence, the [a]ppellant contended that the burden of proof lay upon the 
[r]espondent to eliminate all possibilities other than manipulation by the 
[a]ppellant.  We do not believe that this position reflects a correct legal 
analysis.  The [r]espondent's burden was only, but sufficiently, to make the 
Panel “comfortably satisfied” that the [a]ppellant was the culprit.32 
 
The justification for the adoption of this standard, rather than one of beyond 
reasonable doubt, was expressed by the CAS as being necessary to avoid applying standards 
appropriate in the “public law of the state [rather than] the private law of an association.”33  
This standard has been specifically identified as being appropriate in cases involving personal 
reputation and professional misconduct and, as such, with one or two reservations identified 
elsewhere in this article, would appear to be appropriate for anti-doping incidents such as 
those being discussed.34  Further, it is this standard that has been adopted by WADA and 
therefore applies to anti-doping cases in general, and in particular, to Claudia Pechstein’s 
biological passport case.  Indeed, when Pechstein challenged the application of this standard, 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) opined, 
The view of the Arbitral Tribunal that the [r]espondent must prove a doping 
[offense] “to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel” does not 
violate public policy but refers to the allocation of the burden of proof and the 
standard of evidence which, in the area of application of private law—even 
where disciplinary measures of private sporting [organizations] are under 
review—cannot be determined from the perspective of criminal law concepts 
such as the presumption of innocence or the principles of “in dubio pro reo” or 
on the basis of the guarantees which result from the ECHR. Even with respect 
                                  
30
 WADA CODE art. 2.2. 
31
 See generally B. v. Féd’n Int’l de Natation, CAS 98/A/211, (June 7, 1999) (de Bruin was found guilty of 
tampering with her urine sample given during an out-of-competition test).   
32
 Id. ¶¶ 39–40. 
33
 Id. ¶ 26 (citing N., J., Y., & W. v. Féd’n Int’l de Natation, CAS 98/A/208, ¶ 13 (Dec. 22, 1998). 
34
 See Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 00658 04, ¶ 3.4.  
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to her [defense] that the standard of evidence on which the decision was based 
leads to disregard of the principle of proportionality, the [a]ppellant does not 
point out a violation of public policy.35 
This article will first briefly explain the nature of the biological passport and why it 
represents a significant evolutionary development in the fight against doping in sports.  This 
article will then go on to analyze, in detail, the first case brought to CAS using the biological 
passport, specifically against German speed skater Claudia Pechstein.  The article will then 
shift to Pechstein’s unsuccessful appeal to the SFT against her conviction and will move on 
to consider her request for revision of that decision back to the SFT.  This piece will end with 
a brief consideration of the position that the passport may prove to be part of the armory of 
measures available to the anti-doping organizations, which raises the question of whether it 
may lead to a fundamental shift in the emphasis of the war on doping in sports. 
II. THE BIOLOGICAL PASSPORT 
The biological passport is an individual electronic record of blood and urine tests 
taken from sports participants over an extended period of time.36  These tests enable an 
individual hematological profile to be created, which consists of a number of different 
hematological parameters.37  The principle behind the passport is that certain drugs have an 
impact on these parameters, either raising them or lowering them, and therefore making it 
possible to detect doping without the necessity of a failed drug test.38  The individualized 
nature of the profiles increases the sensitivity of the passport, effectively using the athlete’s 
                                  
35
 See Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Tribunal] Feb. 10, 2010, 4A_612/2009 (Switz.), ¶ 6.3.2. 
36
 Biological Passport – Questions/Answers, UNION CYCLISTE INT’L, 
http://www.uci.ch/templates/UCI/UCI2/layout.asp?MenuId=MTU4ODY&LangId=1 (last visited June 21, 
2011). 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. 
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own physiology as a base rather than population norms, as is the case with conventional 
drugs tests.39 
The SFT’s recent ruling in Pechstein v. International Skating Union40, which 
confirmed the decision of the CAS against Pechstein,41 seems to have added yet another 
string to the bow of the sporting authorities against doping users.  Although the International 
Skating Union (ISU) has been at the forefront of the development of the biological passport, 
it is not the only international sporting authority that has been pushing the development of the 
technology.  The International Cycling Union (UCI) introduced its own biological passport at 
the start of the 2008 season.42  After some initial problems and disagreements with WADA, 
which at one point led WADA to withdraw its support for UCI’s program,43 the UCI declared 
that five cyclists needed to respond to doping allegations after submitting abnormal results 
under the new testing program.44  Thus, WADA imposed the first sanction of a sports 
participant caught using the biological passport on May 28, 2010, which led to its Director 
General stating that 
“The Athlete Biological Passport adds a powerful tool to support the fight 
against doping in sport . . . . Coupled with other strategies, it makes prohibited 
preparations harder to implement by those athletes who may take the risk to 
cheat.  We know that the effects of some substances remain detectable in the 
body longer than the substances themselves.  The Athlete Biological Passport 
Model allows the anti-doping community to exploit this reality through a 
similar approach to that used in forensic science. . . . We look forward to 
seeing more anti-doping organizations follow in the UCI’s footsteps and 
                                  
39
 See Athlete Biological Passport, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/Science-
Medicine/Athlete-Biological-Passport/ (last updated Dec. 2009); Biological Passport – Questions/Answers, 
supra note 36. 
40
 See generally Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009. 
41
 See generally Arbitral Award, Pechstein v. Int’l Skating Union, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf 
Gemeinschaft e.V.v v. Int’l Skating Union, CAS 2009/A/1913 (Nov. 25, 2009).  
42
 See Has Peloton Cleaned Up Its Act or Will Dirty Tactics Prevail?, THE SUN. TIMES (London) (July 4, 2008) 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/more_sport/cycling/article4264752.ece. 
43
 Julien Pretot, WADA Withdraws Support for UCI Biological Passport, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2008), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2784271420080327. 
44
 Gregor Brown, UCI Names First Five Biological Passport Violators, CYCLING NEWS (June 17, 2009), 
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/uci-names-first-five-biological-passport-violators.  
9 
 
implement such longitudinal follow-up programs in the comings [sic] months 
and years.”45 
The UCI followed the sanction with notable success with the CAS, which confirmed 
the rigor of the biological passport in detecting doping violations, which was highlighted in 
recent decisions rendered by the CAS against Pietro Caucchioli,46 Franco Pellizotti,47 and 
Tadej Valjavec.48 
On December 1, 2009, WADA approved new Athlete Biological Passport Operating 
Guidelines, which stated very clearly that “[t]he fundamental principle of the Athlete 
Biological Passport is based on the monitoring of an athlete’s biological variables over time 
to facilitate indirect detection of doping on a longitudinal basis, rather than on the traditional 
direct detection of doping.”49 
At the same time, in the United Kingdom, several British athletes were placed on the 
biological passport program, which required them to submit blood samples throughout their 
careers.50  The key to the biological passport lies not in what it tests, but how it tests, as 
Professor David Cowan51 commented: 
“This new [program] will compare the athlete with himself or herself rather 
than against the population at large. The effect of this will make it far easier to 
catch the doped athlete. We believe that this will act as a powerful deterrent 
for the good of all healthy athletes and maintain the integrity of sport.”52 
The notion of effectively measuring against the athlete’s own physiology rather than 
standard population norms is nothing new.  A similar provision was explained in Collins as 
                                  
45
 WADA Welcomes First Athlete Biological Passport Sanction, WADA, (May 28, 2010), http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/News-Center/Articles/WADA-Welcomes-First-Athlete-Biological-Passport-Sanction/.  
46
 See generally Caucchioli v. Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano & Union Cycliste Internationale, CAS 
2010/A/2178 (Mar. 8, 2011) (unofficial translation of original French text). 
47
 See generally Pellizotti v. Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano & Union Cycliste Internationale, TAS 
2010/A/2308 & Union Cycliste Internationale v. Pellizotti, Federazione Ciclistica Italiana, & Comitato 
Olimpico Nazionale Italiano, TAS 2011, 2011/A/2335 (June 14, 2011). 
48
 See generally Union Cycliste Internationale v. Valjavec, CAS 2010/A/2235 (Apr. 21, 2011).  
49
 Athlete Biological Passport, supra note 39.  
50
 See U.K. Anti-Doping Introduces Athlete Biological Passport, U.K. ANTI-DOPING, 
http://www.ukad.org.uk/news/athlete-biological-passport (last visited June 28, 2010). 
51
 Director of the King’s College London Drug Control Centre, the only accredited anti-doping laboratory in the 
United Kingdom. 
52
 U.K. Anti-Doping Introduces Athlete Biological Passport, supra note 50. 
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being critical in the finding of guilt, with reference to levels of testosterone and 
epitestosterone.53  The USADA Panel stated, 
A normal T/E ratio is 1/1, although the specific ratio will vary from person to 
person.  The [Code] sets an abnormal T/E ratio at 6/1, which is above what 
one would expect normally to occur. Regardless of a person’s own baseline 
ratio, his or her ratio will generally stay consistent, with a normal variation in 
women of up to 60%.  The variation in Collins’s T/E ratio in 2003 alone, on 
the other hand, was more than 1000%.54 
Despite the obvious benefits that may be derived from focusing testing on athletes 
against themselves, which were explained in Collins and are very much a feature of the 
biological passport, the administration of the passport scheme itself has not been universally 
welcomed by all of those involved in the fight against doping.  In what may be seen as more 
of an attack on the UCI rather than on the biological passport, Pierre Bordry,55 at a recent 
anti-doping symposium, stated, “‘I [do not] think the biological passport is useful . . . . What 
we need is neutral information on biological data.  And we need a biological passport that is 
absolutely transparent to target riders.  Everybody should deserve the same treatment.’”56 
It is apparent, however, that the biological passport is here to stay.  In Pechstein,57 
CAS confirmed its satisfaction with the technology and its practice, a decision that the SFT 
affirmed.58 
III. CAS 2009/A/1912 CLAUDIA PECHSTEIN V. INTERNATIONAL SKATING UNION 
A. Background 
Claudia Pechstein has been competing at the elite level of speed skating since 1988.59   
During that time, she has taken part in five Olympic Games, winning five gold, and numerous 
                                  
53
 See Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 00658 04, ¶ 2.3. 
54
 Id. ¶ 4.18. 
55
 French Anti-Doping Agency President 
56
 Samuel Petrequin, French Anti-Doping Agency President Pierre Bordry Criticizes UCI’s Biological Passport, 
THE GAEA TIMES (June 10, 2010), http://blog.taragana.com/business/2010/06/10/french-anti-doping-agency-
president-pierre-bordry-criticizes-ucis-biological-passport-69294/. 
57
 See generally Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft e.V.v., 
CAS 2009/A/1913. 
58
 See generally Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009. 
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other, medals during her career.60  As has already been stated, along with the UCI, the ISU 
has been at the forefront of developing the biological passport to combat doping in its 
respective sport.  Both organizations adopted the biological passport measure before it 
received formal backing from WADA, and it was against this background that blood samples 
from Pechstein were analyzed and found to display evidence of a possible doping violation, 
which became the subject of first, a case brought to the CAS,61 and then second, the final 
appeal to the SFT.62  
For a period of just over nine years, running from February 2000 until April 2009, 
Pechstein, in common with many other skaters of her caliber, underwent numerous drug tests, 
and, during this time, she never once failed any such test.63  Over ninety blood samples were 
collected from her to be used to aid development of her biological passport.64  Collection of 
these samples accelerated between October 2007 and April 2009, with twenty-seven samples 
collected, including twelve in the final four months of that period.65  The CAS explained the 
parameters that are measured from the samples: 
The blood parameters [that] are measured and recorded within the scope of the 
[r]espondent’s blood profiling program include inter alia hemoglobin, 
hematocrit[,] and percentage of reticulocytes, (“%retics”).  Reticulocytes are 
immature red blood cells that are released from the bone marrow.  The %retics 
is a sensitive hematological parameter[,] which provides a real-time 
assessment of the functional state of erythropoiesis66 in a person’s organism.67 
It was on the percentage of reticulocytes that Pechstein’s readings proved to be 
problematic.  The CAS pointed out that the ISU considered that normal values fell between 
                                                                                                          
59
 Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft e.V.v., CAS 
2009/A/1913, ¶ 1. 
60
 Id. 
61
 See generally id. 
62
 See generally Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009. 
63
 Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft e.V.v., CAS 
2009/A/1913, ¶ 5. 
64
 Id. ¶ 6. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Red blood cell production—a very important feature for endurance athletes in particular. 
67
 Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft e.V.v., CAS 
2009/A/1913, ¶ 7. 
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0.4 and 2.4.68  Although Pechstein’s profile, which resulted from her blood samples in 
isolation, may not have been particularly serious, it was the pattern produced that proved to 
be damning.  Just one day before a major championship, a sample taken on February 6, 2009 
showed a %retic reading of 3.49.69  Two more readings were taken on the first day of the 
championship, and those readings were 3.54 and 3.38, respectively.70  Just over a week later, 
another sample was taken, which showed that her reading had dropped to 1.37.71  By that 
time, Pechstein was an athlete approaching the veteran stage of her career, a time when a 
natural decline may be expected in her performance.  Further concerns were also raised about 
the frequency with which Pechstein had changed her “whereabouts”72 in January and 
February of 2009.  Pechstein’s movement made it very difficult to apply any “out-of-
competition” testing on her.73  Following a review of Pechstein’s profile on March 5, 2009, 
the ISU accused her of violating Article 2.2 of its anti-doping code,74 which conformed to the 
new WADA code that came into effect January 1, 2009.75  The ISU Disciplinary Committee 
subsequently imposed a two-year ban on Pechstein, commencing February 9, 2009, which 
Pechstein then appealed to the CAS.76   
 Pechstein, unsurprisingly, denied the allegations, citing concerns about the timings 
involved in the procedure.77  She pointed out that, despite being tested on numerous 
occasions, she had never failed a drug test.78  She also suggested that she had not given her 
                                  
68
 Id. ¶ 8. This was disputed by Pechstein; however, Pechstein’s criticism of this interpretation was rejected by 
the CAS. 
69
 Id. ¶ 9. 
70
 Id. ¶ 10. 
71
 Id. ¶¶ 8-11. 
72
 There is a requirement upon an elite sports participant to provide whereabouts for one hour each day, between 
6 a.m. and 11 p.m. for the purposes of out-of-competition testing.  
73
 See Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft e.V.v., CAS 
2009/A/1913 at ¶ 68. 
74
 Namely using the prohibited method of blood doping in violation of article 2.2, (Use or attempted use by an 
athlete of a prohibited method or prohibited substance). See id. ¶ 12. 
75
 Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009 at 3. 
76
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express written permission or consent to use any evidence of blood doping.79  She stressed 
her position that the ISU had not complied with relevant WADA standards on testing, chain 
of custody, or documentation of results.80  Perhaps her most significant defense, however, 
certainly from the perspective of the future use of the biological passport, was her assertion 
that the upper limit for %retics proscribed by the ISU (i.e., 2.4) was far too low, and that it 
was perfectly normal for a healthy woman to have a reading fluctuating between 0.8 and 
4.1%retics.81  Further, Pechstein asserted that her %retics readings had always remained 
above the 0.5 that should normally be expected following a period of erythropoietin abuse.82  
She also questioned the accuracy of the machine used to measure the %retics and the 
reliability of the sampling.83  Moreover, Pechstein also cast doubt upon the accuracy of the 
%retics measurement when set in context of both her hemoglobin and hematocrit levels.84  In 
short, she questioned the reliability and accuracy of the whole procedure around the samples 
taken for the longitudinal testing, which led to her violation of the ISU anti-doping code.  Her 
final point related to the burden of proof to be expected of the ISU in proving a doping 
violation.  She suggested, as the CAS pointed out, “that the ISU must convince the Panel to a 
level very close to ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that all alternative causes for the increase of 
%retics can be excluded and that, additionally, the [a]thlete had an intention to use blood 
doping.”85 
In contrast, it was the ISU’s contention that because Pechstein had been charged with 
use of a prohibited substance or method rather than attempted use, under Article 2.2 of the 
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ISU anti-doping regulations, it was unnecessary for ISU to prove any such intent to use blood 
doping.86  
Following confirmation that the CAS had jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute, 
pursuant to Article R47 of the CAS Code and Article 13.2.1 of the ISU anti-doping 
regulations,87 the CAS went on to explain that in accordance with Article R57 of the CAS 
Code, “[t]he Panel shall have full power to review the facts and the law.”88  This meant, of 
course, that the panel could look at the case in detail rather than just examine the correctness 
of the original decision, looking at both procedural and substantive issues.89  This was 
especially important as new issues for the CAS were being examined with the reliability of 
the biological passport program.  Pechstein, it should not be forgotten had not failed any 
drugs tests, neither in competition nor out of competition.90  There was some relevant 
precedent from the United States,91 as was pointed out by the Panel,92 but nevertheless these 
were new issues for the CAS. 
An interesting argument raised by Pechstein related to, as she saw it, her lack of 
consent to the use, by the ISU, of her blood samples as evidence of blood doping.93  In raising 
this point, Pechstein seemed to be suggesting one of two possible arguments.  The first being 
that the ISU rules were unclear as to whether her samples could be used to test for blood 
doping, and, therefore, any perceived ambiguity should be resolved in accordance with the 
decision in Wilander v. Tobin,94 which is construed in favor of the athlete.  This issue was not 
explored, as Pechstein instead concentrated on the argument that there was a clear lack of 
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agreement that her samples should be used in the manner that the ISU had used them.  In 
Pechstein’s case, the CAS concluded on this particular issue: 
Ms[.] Pechstein has been participating in “international activities” for more 
than two decades.  In willingly registering for international skating 
competitions sanctioned by the ISU, she obviously expressed her acceptance 
of ISU rules and regulations, including the ISU [Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR)]. . . . When they accede to competition, athletes cannot pick 
and choose the rules they like; accordingly, the Panel finds that Ms. Pechstein 
has been at all times during her international career under an obligation to 
comply with all ISU regulations, including all applicable anti-doping rules.95 
Additionally, Pechstein’s agreement with the anti-doping rules was reinforced by the 
fact that she never objected to any sample collection, and, further, she actually signed each 
form or barcode used to identify her own particular blood samples.96  The CAS could discern 
no ambiguity in ISU’s anti-doping regulations and, to the contrary, stressed that 
Article 6.2 of the ISU ADR expressly authorizes the ISU to use blood samples 
to “detect” a prohibited method[,] and[] more specifically, to create a profile 
from the relevant parameters in a skater’s blood “for [a]nti-[d]oping 
purposes[,]”[] thus including a finding of “use” under Article 2.2 of the ISU 
ADR.97  
The CAS’ position was further reinforced by the WADA guidelines on blood sample 
collection, which state that such longitudinal profiling can be used for “anti[-]doping 
purposes in accordance with Article 2.2 of the Code.”98  
 Pechstein also raised concerns about using blood profiling to prove an anti-doping 
violation, suggesting that it was only on January 1, 2009, that the new WADA and ISU anti-
doping regulations came into force and that the use of longitudinal profiling for this purpose 
was expressly stated in the ISU ADR.99  She therefore suggested that using any of her 
samples prior to that date would effectively amount to retroactive punishment,100 which is 
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forbidden by the ISU ADR and also by Swiss law, under which the CAS and the ISU operate.  
The CAS, however, clearly stated that Pechstein’s longitudinal profile (i.e., her biological 
passport) provided sufficient evidence for a breach of Article 2.2 of the ISU ADR, and that 
this interpretation was perfectly possible under both the old and the new ISU ADR.101  The 
2009 ISU ADR made it clear that an anti-doping violation under Article 2.2, “Use or Any 
Use,” could always be demonstrated by “any reliable evidentiary means” under the old or the 
new regulations, and, therefore, there was no concern about any issues of retroactive 
punishment.102   
Interestingly, the CAS further emphasized that the only concerns with regard to the 
use of old samples may be if the samples fall outside the appropriate eight-year limitation 
period.  As the CAS stated, “[a]s long as the substantive rule sanctioning a given conduct as 
doping is in force prior to the conduct, the resort to a new evidentiary method does not 
constitute a case of retrospective application of the law.”103 
This rule has to be appropriate with the offense clearly defined and the samples 
collected.  This in no way could be viewed as retroactive punishment, but merely a necessity 
for further scientific analysis using more complex and up-to-date methods on samples already 
collected.  This approach was later confirmed in Caucchioli v. CONI, where the CAS 
reiterated that the biological passport 
represents only a new method for screening of blood doping, already 
prohibited by other standards.  New scientific methods . . .  may be used at any 
time to prove that past abuses, with the only restrictions on the term of use 
samples for the fight against doping (set at eight years) and the beginning 
disciplinary procedures in a timely manner. . . . Therefore, the use of new 
methods do not constitute a case of retroactive application of standards . . . .104 
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What was rightly of more concern to the CAS was the question of whether longitudinal 
blood profiling could be interpreted as a “reliable means” for testing.  Was the scientific basis 
of longitudinal profiling sufficiently robust to enable a clear and categorical judgment of 
whether an anti-doping violation under Article 2.2 had taken place?  This fundamental point, 
the CAS suggested, could be broken down into five distinct questions, each of which must be 
proven:  (1) Were the relevant blood samples properly taken?; (2) Was there a reliable chain 
of custody of the samples from collection to the laboratory?; (3)Was the analysis machine 
accurate and reliable?; (4) Was the transmission of the samples to and from their storage in 
the ISU data base reliable?; and (5) Was it clear that “the hematological values of Ms[.] 
Pechstein are reliable evidence of her use of a prohibited method in violation of Article 2.2 of 
the ISU ADR?”105 
It was made clear by the CAS that no presumption should be made about the reliability 
of the analysis machine;106 that they were satisfied that the samples were properly 
collected;107 that the number of tests analyzed was appropriate;108 that the chain of custody 
was safe, secure, and scientifically sound;109 and that the analysis machine and methods of 
analysis were reliable.  It was made clear that all of the aforementioned questions had to be, 
and could be, established according to the appropriate standard of proof.  It was confirmed by 
the CAS that this case involved an offense of strict liability, meaning that no fault or 
negligence in the commission of the anti-doping violation had to be proven by the ISU on the 
part of Pechstein.110  
 The more interesting question concerned the appropriate standard of proof that was 
required to demonstrate the doping violation.  Pechstein asserted, bearing in mind the 
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particular seriousness of the allegation against her, that the allegation needs to be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.111  However, the CAS emphasized that the appropriate standard 
was that of “comfortable satisfaction . . . bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation” as 
per the ISU ADR.112  
This measure had been adopted by WADA in 2003 and has been examined in some 
detail in case law since.  It was reported in Collins113 that the standard originated from “court 
decisions in Australia and other Commonwealth countries that created a standard for cases 
involving personal reputation more stringent than [the] balance of probabilities but less 
burdensome than beyond a reasonable doubt.”114 
Like the Pechstein case, the case of Michelle Collins also involved an athlete accused 
of doping but had not actually failed a drug test.  Evidence from e-mail correspondence and 
analysis of blood and urine samples displayed tell-tale signs of doping by Collins.115  In at 
least this respect, it can be suggested that the two cases bear striking similarities.  However, 
in Pechstein, the comfortable satisfaction standard was breached without the benefit of a trail 
of damning e-mail evidence.  Rather, in Pechstein, there was data from Pechstein’s blood 
samples to rely upon.116  The link between the professional misconduct cases involving 
personal reputation, as alluded to above, is the forerunner to the imposed standard, and, thus, 
cases involving doping in sports, perhaps, invite some caution.  Reputation lost through a 
professional misconduct case will invariably have consequences only at a local level and is 
unlikely to have significant impact beyond one’s own domestic and professional life.  
However, for a high-profile athlete to be found guilty of a doping offense, with or without the 
smoking gun of a failed test, has grave consequences at a domestic level and goes far beyond 
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to a national and international level.  This impact will also encroach beyond an athlete’s 
immediate professional environment.  A “drug cheat” will lose the chance to earn income in 
related industries, such as coaching or media work.  Likewise, publicity surrounding his or 
her “conviction” is likely to be of national or international interest, and, therefore, the damage 
to his or her reputation may be that much more severe.  Thus, it is crucial that the comfortable 
satisfaction test truly does reflect these circumstances.  Just as negligence in sports is 
predicated on the importance of ordinary negligence taking into account all the 
circumstances,117 it is important in the world of anti-doping that the circumstances remain 
fundamental.  Where the consequences of a guilty verdict are potentially more severe, then 
the burden of proof should rise to reflect these more serious consequences.  The fact that this 
notion has been expressly acknowledged in several cases118 should reassure those who may 
be concerned that there is the potential to find an athlete guilty and to impose a significant 
penalty by merely overcoming a burden of proof, which may, at first glance, appear to be 
very low.  This is not the case, particularly when the serious consequences and impact on the 
level of proof that any panel may require to demonstrate a doping violation are both taken 
into consideration.  Significantly, the standard of comfortable satisfaction has also withstood 
scrutiny from the SFT.119  
Therefore, the key issue is being able to define the limits of what may be meant by 
comfortable satisfaction.  On paper, it appears to be at the midway point between the civil 
burden of balance of probabilities and the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.  
However, the reality may be somewhat different.  This particular argument was rehearsed in 
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the cases of United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Gaines120 and in United States Anti-
Doping Agency v. Montgomery.121  In Gaines, CAS almost seemed to dismiss concern about 
the appropriate standard of proof to be applied, suggesting, 
As often becomes evident when the question of standard of proof is debated, 
the debate looms larger in theory than practice. . . . In all cases[,] the degree of 
probability must be commensurate with and proportionate to those allegations; 
the more serious the allegation the higher the degree of probability, or 
“comfort[,]”[] required.  That is because, in general, the more serious the 
allegation the less likely it is that the alleged event occurred and, hence, the 
stronger the evidence required before the occurrence of the event is 
demonstrated to be more probable than not.122 
The CAS Panel made the point in Gaines that at times, allegations may be grave and 
have very harsh consequences, such as the loss of livelihood and reputation, and because 
these allegations would have very severe consequences if proven means that for the CAS to 
be comfortably satisfied, the evidence and proof must be very clear.  Under such 
circumstances, the CAS suggested that the practical difference between beyond reasonable 
doubt and comfortable satisfaction was minimal.  In Gaines, the CAS concluded on this 
matter: 
From this perspective, and in view of the nature and gravity of the allegations 
at issue in these proceedings, there is no practical distinction between the 
standards of proof advocated by USADA and the Respondents.  It makes little, 
if indeed any, difference whether a “beyond reasonable doubt” or 
“comfortable satisfaction” standard is applied to determine the claims against 
the Respondents.123 
This argument bears the hallmarks presented in the English football hooliganism case 
of Gough v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire.124  In Gough, the appellant argued that if a 
banning order125 was a punishment then it must be predicated on a beyond reasonable doubt 
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burden of proof rather than reasonable belief as outlined in the legislation.126  The English 
court dismissed this argument, suggesting that the standard to be applied, which would have 
been familiar to both Pechstein and Gaines, would be practically indistinguishable from the 
criminal, beyond reasonable doubt standard.  Lord Phillips MR commented on such banning 
orders: 
While technically the civil standard of proof applies, that standard is flexible 
and must reflect the consequences that will follow if the case for a banning 
order is made out.  This should lead the [justices] to apply an exacting 
standard of proof that will, in practice, be hard to distinguish from the criminal 
standard . . . . In practice the “reasonable grounds” will almost inevitably 
consist of evidence of past conduct. . . . Those requirements, if properly 
applied in the manner described above, will provide a satisfactory threshold 
for the making of a banning order.127 
One may question whether this reasonable satisfaction standard, albeit one that in the 
English court’s mind is apparently similar to the criminal standard, is sufficiently rigorous 
when set against the severity of any drug ban.  A guilty verdict obtained through use of the 
biological passport will almost certainly be able to demonstrate a pattern of drug abuse, 
whereas a failed test merely demonstrates that the athlete was guilty on that particular 
occasion.  Therefore, with this in mind, a pattern of abuse will clearly be viewed as more 
serious than any single transgression.  It is also more likely that such a pattern of abuse will 
fall foul of aggravating circumstances outlined in Article 10.6 of the the Code.128  Comment 
to Article 10.6 in the Code states, 
Examples of aggravating circumstances [that] may justify the imposition of a 
period of [i]neligibility greater than the standard sanction are: the [a]thlete or 
other [p]erson committed the anti-doping rule violation as part of a doping 
plan or scheme, either individually or involving a conspiracy or common 
enterprise to commit anti-doping rule violations; the [a]thlete or other [p]erson 
[u]sed or [p]ossessed multiple [p]rohibited [s]ubstances or [p]rohibited 
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[m]ethods or [u]sed or [p]ossessed a [p]rohibited [s]ubstance or [p]rohibited 
[m]ethod on multiple occasions . . . .129 
This is, by no means, a definitive list of circumstances that may lead to a finding of 
aggravating circumstances.  It is clear, however, that use of a prohibited method or substance 
on multiple occasions will be enough to satisfy Article 10.6 of the Code.  It is also clear that 
the use of the biological passport is much more likely to detect multiple uses than in-
competition or out-of-competition testing.  Does this raise questions of equity in the Code, 
particularly when there has not been a universal adoption of the biological passport in all 
sports governed by the Code?  Should the burden of proof remain, overtly at least, one of 
reasonable satisfaction when the consequences are potentially much more serious for the 
athlete running afoul through the biological passport standard than through more 
conventional testing?  
In Claudia Pechstein’s case, the CAS confirmed that she was guilty of a doping 
violation according to Article 2.2 of the ISU ADR, and, pursuant to Article 10.2 of the same 
regulations, she was declared ineligible from competition for two years.130 
B. The Appeal to the Swiss Federal Tribunal131 
Following Pechstein’s defeat with the CAS, she launched her final appeal in the 
SFT.132  In her submission, the major thrust of her appeal was that the CAS Secretary General 
and other unnamed third parties had unfairly influenced the CAS decision.133  Pechstein was 
denied an extensive judicial review of the CAS decision in line with appropriate federal 
statutes, which restrict the scope of judicial review of international arbitration proceedings.134  
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In a ruling that proved fairly damning to Pechstein’s appeal, the SFT resoundingly 
rejected her challenge of the factual findings by the CAS, reporting, “[a]t various points as in 
her further grounds for appeal, [Pechstein] deviates from the factual findings of the CAS or 
widens them without asserting any substantiated exceptions to the binding character of the 
factual findings.  To that extent, her submissions must remain unheeded.”135   
Pechstein’s attempts to introduce new evidence were also similarly rejected,136 with 
the SFT stressing that this in no way violated her right to be heard.137  “[I]n arbitration 
proceedings, as in civil proceedings, the parties cannot submit new allegations and evidence 
at any time and without restriction.  This does not constitute a violation of the right to be 
heard but is in line with generally [recognized] procedural principles.”138 
The main thrust of Pechstein’s appeal, however, concerned the CAS itself and its 
independence.139  She based an interesting argument around the inevitable and, as she saw it, 
negative outcome of her CAS hearing.  Pechstein suggested that there was clear pressure on 
the IOC to prove its opposition to doping to its major sponsors, and, in order to accomplish 
this goal, the CAS needed to demonstrate the accuracy and reliability of the doping 
passport.140  Therefore, Pechstein suggested that being found guilty by the CAS was 
unsurprising and that her guilty verdict was greeted enthusiastically by the IOC Vice 
President, who stated, “‘the decision of the CAS shows that sports law is opening up more 
possibilities in the fight against doping in athletes than state law was ever able to.’”141 
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The thrust of the appeal appears to have been an attempt to reignite a debate that had 
been settled as far back as 1992 in an appeal from a CAS decision,142 which was 
subsequently appealed to the SFT in March 1993.143  In that case, a horse jockey was initially 
suspended for three months and fined when his horse tested positive for a banned substance, 
which he then appealed to the CAS.144  At arbitration, the CAS reduced the suspension to just 
one month.145  However, despite the reduction, the jockey appealed the decision to the SFT, 
alleging that the CAS was not sufficiently impartial and independent due to its close 
relationship, including financing, with the IOC.146  Although the SFT dismissed this case, it 
noted its concern that there were numerous links between the CAS and the IOC: the CAS was 
financed almost entirely by the IOC, the IOC had authority to modify the CAS statutes, and 
the IOC retained a large degree of influence in appointing the CAS arbitrators.147  The SFT 
commented, in obiter, 
[C]ertain objections with regard to the independence of the CAS could not be 
set aside without another form of process, in particular those based on the 
organic and economic ties existing between the CAS and the IOC.  In fact[,] 
the latter is competent to modify the CAS Statute; it also bears the operating 
cost of this court and plays a considerable role in the appointment of its 
members.148 
The CAS has taken to discuss its own history, noting, 
In the view of the [SFT], such links would have been sufficient seriously to 
call into question the independence of the CAS in the event of the IOC’s being 
a party to proceedings before it.  The [SFT’s] message was thus perfectly 
clear: the CAS had to be made more independent of the IOC both 
[organizationally] and financially.149   
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Following this criticism of the relationship between the CAS and IOC, the CAS made 
changes to its constitution with the aim of remedying the obiter comments of the SFT.150 
It was not until May 2003 that the issue of the impartiality of the CAS was examined 
in detail by the SFT and these changes were tested.151  The case involved two Russian cross-
country skiers152 who finished first and second, respectively, in the five-kilometer pursuit 
event at the 2002 Winter Olympics.153  Although they passed their doping tests immediately 
after the event, both subsequently failed a later test following another cross-country event at 
the same Olympic Games.154  The athlete who finished third in the pursuit event appealed to 
CAS and was awarded the gold medal.155  The Russian skiers took their case to the SFT, and 
the SFT proceeded to dissect the relationship between the IOC and the CAS and examine the 
impartiality of the CAS, concluding that the CAS was not 
the vassal of the IOC . . . .  
. . . . 
. . . There appears to be no viable alternative to this institution, which can 
resolve international sports-related disputes quickly and inexpensively.  
Certainly, the plaintiffs have not suggested one.  The CAS, with its current 
structure, can undoubtedly be improved. . . . Having gradually built up the 
trust of the sporting world, this institution[,] which is now widely [recognized] 
and which will soon celebrate its twentieth birthday, remains one of the 
principal mainstays of [organized] sport.156 
The merit of Pechstein’s impartiality claim seemed questionable and it was almost 
doomed before it started.  As was made clear by the SFT, a basic principle of Swiss Law is 
good faith, which naturally applies to arbitration awards before the CAS and appealed to the 
SFT.157  All the CAS awards and SFT rulings are based on Swiss contract law, which has the 
requirement of good faith as one of its guiding principles.  
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The duty to act in good faith is a universally [recognized] 
principle of law that applies also in the framework of arbitral 
proceedings and is part of both substantive and procedural 
public policy . . . . The bona fides principle encompasses the 
duty to act in good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights . 
. . . The duty to act in accordance with the requirements of good 
faith applies to both the arbitral tribunal and the parties . . . .158  
These rules can be excluded of course by agreement of the parties, and, further, if they 
wish to object to non-compliance with those rules, then they must do so immediately 
“otherwise they shall be deemed to have waived their right to object.”159  The fact that 
Pechstein failed to raise the issue of lack of impartiality at the time the CAS heard her case 
proved to have serious consequences for her appeal.  The SFT commented: 
The Appellant herself appealed to the CAS and signed the Procedural Order of 
September 29, 2009 without raising objections with respect to independence 
or impartiality.  Under these circumstances it is not compatible with the 
principle of good faith to raise the issue of impartiality of the Arbitral Tribunal 
applied for the first time before the [Swiss] Federal Tribunal in the framework 
of an appeal.  The grievance of lack of independence of the arbitral tribunal 
asserted by the Appellant is therefore not capable of appeal. . . . [H]er 
submissions of a general nature do not give rise to reasonable doubts as to the 
independence of the CAS.  The grievance of lack of independence of the CAS 
would thus be unsubstantiated anyway.160 
Pechstein also tried to suggest that the President of the Arbitral Tribunal was partial, 
seemingly basing her accusation on a comment that he made in 2007 suggesting his “hard 
line on doping issues,” his close ties with the IOC, and its prominence in sports governance in 
Italy.161  Once more, these concerns were given short shrift by the SFT, as they were 
dismissed on the grounds of being too vague and lacking connection to the case at hand.162 
The SFT raised an interesting point in relation to the CAS’ refusal to allow 
Pechstein’s manager to attend the hearing.  Although, the SFT confirmed the CAS Rule 
Article R44.2, which held that “[u]nless the parties agree otherwise, the hearings are not 
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public,”163 and that Pechstein failed to demonstrate to what extent Swiss Law governing 
international arbitration enabled such proceedings to take place in public,164 the SFT 
nevertheless had some unease about this issue, suggesting that where the athlete requests it, 
such hearings should be held in public.  Specifically, the SFT stated, 
Be this as it may, in view of the outstanding significance of the CAS in the 
field of sport, it would be desirable for a public hearing to be held on request 
by the athlete concerned with a view to the trust in the independence and 
fairness of the decision making process.165 
It will be interesting to see whether the CAS introduces such a provision into its code, in 
much the same way that it moved to accommodate the implied criticisms made of its 
relationship with the IOC in Gundel.166 
In comprehensively dismissing the appeal, the SFT reiterated the very clear lines with 
regard to public policy,167 which Pechstein had suggested had been violated by the award 
against her. 
The material adjudication of a dispute violates public policy only when it 
ignores some fundamental legal principles and is therefore plainly inconsistent 
with the fundamental, widely recognized system of values, which according to 
the prevailing opinions in Switzerland, should be the basis of any legal order.  
Among such principles are: the fidelity to contracts (pacta sunt servanda), the 
prohibition of abuse of rights, the principle of good faith, the prohibition of 
expropriation without compensation, the prohibition of discrimination and the 
protection of incapables.168 
  Although these particular principles, upon which the central pillars of Swiss Law are 
founded, are perhaps fairly obvious, the notion of public policy detailed in the Swiss Private 
International Law Act169 (PILA) is clearly capable of wider interpretation.  Pechstein 
suggested that one such interpretation should include the notion of human dignity and that 
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submitting her samples to a veterinarian violated her own human dignity,170 essentially 
treating her as an animal, and, therefore, the interpretation should be deemed to be against 
public policy which should, according to Article 190(e) of PILA, annul the award.171  The 
SFT, in rejecting Pechstein’s submission, pointed out the weakness in her very narrow 
interpretation of the realities of expert scientific testimony.  “The fact that the principle of 
human dignity would prohibit a university based scientist, who is inter alia  a qualified 
veterinarian, from acting as an expert in the framework of doping proceedings is not 
demonstrated.”172  
Had the SFT accepted Pechstein’s appeal on this point, then taken to its logical, albeit 
extended conclusion, there would appear to have been a real danger that the utility of 
scientific evidence produced before tribunals and the analysis of samples in the first place 
would be severely compromised, with only scientists with a very narrow range of expertise 
authorized to examine samples.  It is clear from the SFT that the pedigree of the scientist is 
irrelevant as long as the scientist has relevant expertise.   
In roundly rejecting Pechstein’s appeal the SFT concluded that 
she makes criticisms of an appellate nature of the award and presents her own 
views of the facts . . . . [S]he refers to numerous findings by the CAS as 
arbitrary, contradictory, incorrect or contrary to the file, but does not 
demonstrate to what extent it was impossible for her as a result to put forward 
and prove her point . . . in the proceedings.  She merely claims sweepingly at 
various points a violation of the principle of the right to be heard or of public 
policy without meeting the statutory requirements for reasons.173 
 
C. Request to the Swiss Federal Tribunal for Revision174 
In a request for revision dated March 4, 2010, Pechstein submitted to the SFT that it 
should annul the previous award of the CAS and send the matter back to the CAS for a new 
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award.175   Concerning the role of revision by the SFT in international arbitration awards, the 
SFT commented: 
The Federal Private International Law of December 18, 1997 contains no 
provisions as to the revision of arbitral awards within the meaning of Art 176 
ff PILA. According to case law of the Federal Tribunal, which filled the 
lacuna, the parties to an international arbitration have the extraordinary legal 
recourse of revision available, for which the Federal tribunal has jurisdiction.  
If the Federal Tribunal upholds a request it does not decide the matter itself 
but sends it back to the arbitral tribunal that decided it or to a new arbitral 
tribunal to be constituted.176 
The grounds for revision are very restrictive: 
[R]evision may be sought when the petitioner subsequently discovers 
significant facts or decisive evidence which he could not adduce in the 
previous proceedings to the exclusion of facts and evidence which emerged 
only after the award.  The new facts must be significant, i.e., they must be 
suitable to change the factual basis of the award so that an accurate legal 
evaluation could lead to another decision. . . . Should the new evidence prove 
factual allegations already made previously, the petitioner must show that he 
could not bring the evidence in the earlier proceedings.177 
The SFT was scathing of Pechstein’s request for revision, pointing out that she 
brought no new evidence forward and instead relied on evidence that dealt extensively with 
the original CAS award, namely with the issue of her hereditary spherocytosis, the inherited 
disorder that she alleged caused the anomalies in her blood parameters, which eventually led 
to her two-year ban.178  Further, the SFT made it clear that Pechstein failed to cross the 
substantial threshold of demonstrating exactly why she had been unable to previously bring 
this evidence.179  It dismissed her allegations as vague, relying on scientifically 
unsubstantiated methods over and above a more established analysis.180  Based on such 
damning criticism, it is hardly surprising that the application for revision was rejected, with 
the SFT concluding, 
                                  
175
 Id. ¶ C. 
176
 Id. ¶ 2. 
177
 Id. ¶ 2.1.2. 
178
 Id. ¶ 2.3. 
179
 Id. 
180
 Id. 
30 
 
The Petitioner’s arguments in this respect merely seek a new assessment of the 
evidence.  Yet there is no ground for revision simply because the Arbitral 
Tribunal would have wrongly assessed some facts already known in the 
arbitral proceedings. . . . The request for revision is to be rejected to the extent 
that the matter is capable of revision.181 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
It seems that the biological passport has arrived to add a considerable weapon to the 
armory of the anti-doping industry.  It has received welcome backing from both the CAS and 
the SFT and appears to be firmly established to now sit alongside those other pillars of anti-
doping control, such as the principle of strict liability, the whereabouts rule, WADA’s Anti-
Doping Administration and Management System, and non-analytical positives.  What this 
development does for the first time, though, is to give the hint of a new dawn in anti-doping 
control.  The biological passport raises the possibility of shifting the emphasis away from the 
doping athlete and instead toward prioritizing the “clean” athlete.   
Up to this point in time—quite naturally and due to the limitations imposed by the 
culture of testing, subsequent failed tests, and consequent bansthe emphasis throughout 
sports has usually been on exposing athletes who are cheating.  It is without a doubt that the 
biological passport will continue to do this.  Although it is also the case that, periodically, 
participants have been caught up unwittingly in the system following either the unknowing or 
blameless ingestion of a banned substance, and it is the possible injustices created by this 
problem and the accompanying principle of strict liability that Article 10.5 (exceptional 
circumstances) of the Code sought to ameliorate.  However, the use of non-analytical 
positives highlighted throughout the BALCO scandal began to shift the emphasis away from 
the simple equation of failed test plus strict liability equals guilt and a ban.  For the first time, 
we had the notion of guilt without the failure of a test or indeed the manipulation of a doping 
sample.  What the passport does is raise the possibility of athletes being able to demonstrate 
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their innocence rather than having to disprove their guilt through the production of a passport, 
which contains a profile that is indisputably consistent with a non-doping athlete.  Possession 
of a clean and unblemished passport may come to be viewed as the gateway into sporting 
events, as opposed to the current regime, which seeks to exclude athletes from such events in 
the shape of bans following positive tests.  If this shift in emphasis can lead to a consequent 
change in culture and attitude, then the impact of the passport may be felt far beyond the 
simple notion of making it harder to cheat in sports.  
